FOREIGN JUDGMENTS BASED ON
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS:
THE APPLICABILITY OF RES JUDICATA
I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 30, 1970, the United States formally acceded
to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards,' following congressional enactment of
implementing legislation 2 considered by the Johnson administration to be essential to meeting our responsibilities under the
agreement. 3 In acceding, the United States declared that it
would apply the Convention only to awards "made in the territory of another Contracting State," and then only to "differences
. .which are considered as commercial under the national law
of the United States."' 4 Thus, after twelve years of official
indecision, 5 this country opened its judicial doors to the fruits of
one of the outside world's primary means of dispute settlement-commercial arbitration.
Although the implementing legislation makes clear that the
treatment of awards under the Convention is a matter of federal
*

I Convention

on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,

Sept. 30, 1970, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (effective Dec.
29, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Convention]. The text of the Convention can also be
found after 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (Supp. 1975). On accession, the United States extended the
Convention to "all the territories for the international relations of which the United
States of America is responsible," effective February 1, 1971. [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2560.
2 Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, § 1, 84 Stat. 692 (codified at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201-08 (1970)).
3 S. EXEC. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1968); S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 5-6 (1968).
4 [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2560.
5 The Convention was opened for signature on June 10, 1958. Final Act of the
United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, June 10, 1958, 330
U.N.T.S. 4, 8. In accordance with article XII, the Convention came into force on June 7,
1959. 330 U.N.T.S. 38 n.1. The reasons for the delay in United States accession included
uncertainties about the international and business support for the Convention, the possible effects on state arbitration law, and the unclear constitutional status of federal arbitration law under traditional interpretations of 9 U.S.C. § 1-14 (1970). S. EXEC. REP. No.
10, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1968). The concern over the degree of support proved
unfounded. S. EXEC. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-44 (1968). The legal questions were
eventually resolved as a majority of the states adopted a moreliberal approach to arbitration agreements, and the Supreme Court consigned the implementation of title
9 to the
"federal common law" in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967). S.ExEc. REP. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1968).
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law, neither the treaty nor the legislation deals with the treatment of a judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal on an arbitral award as a result of a prior enforcement effort. As will be
shown, a significant number of awards under the Convention
will enter the United States for enforcement accompanied by
foreign judgments. The courts will naturally be faced with the
question whether the doctrine of merger, an element of res
judicata, is applicable to arbitral awards and foreign judgments
based thereon.
After demonstrating the likelihood that foreign arbitral
awards will reach the United States accompanied by foreign
judgments, and after examining the evolving treatment of
foreign judgments 6 in American courts, this Comment will discuss the policies that should lead the courts to refuse to merge
foreign arbitral awards into foreign judgments based thereon.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The Convention and Its Statutory Implementation
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards 7 requires that a contracting state "recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the
award is relied upon," without imposing "substantially more
onerous conditions or higher fees or charges" for actions on
foreign awards under the Convention than it would for actions
on "domestic" awards."
To fulfill this duty, the courts of a contracting state must
6 As used throughout this Comment, the term "foreign" will refer only to proceedings external to the United States. The term "sister-state" will be used to refer to actions
in one of the fifty states based on proceedings in another.
7 For discussions of the Convention as a whole, see Contini, InternationalCommercial
Arbitration, 8 AM. J. COmP. L. 283 (1959); Domke, The United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, 53 A,. J. INT'L L. 414 (1959); Pisar, The United Nations

Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1959 J. Bus. L. 219; Quigley, Accession by the United
States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral

Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961); Sanders, New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 6 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR INTERNATIONAAL

RECHT 43 (1959); Springer, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 INT'L LAWYER 320 (1969). For an encapsulated but

thorough exposition of the negotiating history of the Convention, see G. HAIGTrr,
CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS

(1958).
1 Convention, art. III.
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enforce an arbitral award unless the award falls within one of the
eight grounds for nonenforcement, including (1) nonarbitrability of the subject matter of the award under the law of the
enforcing nation;!' (2) nonfinality of the award; 10 and (3) violation of the public policy of the enforcing nation."
The legislation implementing the treaty' 2 eliminates jurisdictional hurdles to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
by creating federal question jurisdiction without a jurisdictional
amount, and by vesting in the district courts original jurisdiction
of actions under the Convention.' 3 It also provides for liberal
removal from state court to federal court 14 and requires that an
award be enforced within three years unless one of the specified
15
grounds for refusal of enforcement is satisfied.
9 Id., art. V, para. 2(a).
10Id., art. V, para. 1(e).
11Id., art. V, para. 2(b). Enforcement may also be refused when: (1) the parties to
the arbitration were under some incapacity, id., art. V, para. 1(a); (2) the arbitration
agreement is invalid, id.; (3) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given
proper notice before rendition or was unable to present his case, id., art. V, para. 1(b);
(4) the award does not comply with the expectations of the parties concerning the scope
of the agreement to arbitrate, id., art. V, para. 1(c); and (5) the composition of the
tribunal or the procedure it followed was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties or with the law of the country where the arbitration took place, id., art. V, para.
1(d).
129 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970). By far the most penetrating analysis of the implementing legislation is found in McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on
Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 735 (1971) (reprinted
without footnotes in 26 ARB. J. (n.s.) 65 (1971)). For other treatments, see Aksen, American ArbitrationAccession Arrives in the Age ofAquarius: United States Implements United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U.L. REV. 1
(197 1); Domke, The United States Implementation of the United Nations Arbitral Convention, 19
AM. J. COMP. L. 575 (1971); Evans & Ellis, InternationalCommercial Arbitration:A Comparison of Legal Regimes, 8 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 17 (1973); Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821 (1972); Comment, InternationalCommercial Arbitration Under the
United Nations Convention and the Amended FederalArbitration Statute, 47 WASH. L. REV. 441
(1972). It is interesting to compare the amendments to title 9, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970),
with the legislation suggested in Quigley, supra note 7, at 1079-82.
139 U.S.C. § 203 (1970). One commentator has argued that, read as a whole, the
amendments to tide 9, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970), create exclusive federal jurisdiction.
McMahon, supra note 12, at 746-47. This was the approach advocated in Quigley, supra
note 7, at 1081-82. It would seem, however, that if Congress had wanted to create
exclusive federal jurisdiction, it could have found the words to do so. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1970).
149 U.S.C. § 205 (1970). Liberal removal from state to federal court is a realistic
response to themultifarious means by which an arbitration award may be introduced
into ongoing litigation that, but for the Convention, would have no place in federal court.
Section 205 absorbs the procedures embodied in the general removal statutes, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1446-49 (1970), "except that the ground for removal.., need not appear on the face
of the complaint but may be shown in the petition for removal."
15 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1970). See notes 9-11 supra & accompanying text.
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B. The Likelihood that Foreign Arbitral Awards Entering the United
Statesfor Enforcement Will Be Accompanied by ForeignJudgments
In view of this Comment's thesis that foreign judgments on
arbitral awards present a substantial problem for judicial resolution, it is appropriate to demonstrate that the problem is likely to
arise. As a matter of law, the prevailing party to an arbitration
need not reduce his award to a judgment in the rendering nation before seeking enforcement. 1 6 As a matter of self-interest,
however, the procedural attributes of foreign arbitration laws
and the practical effect of a judgment suggest that the prevailing
party to an arbitration is likely to have sought enforcement in
the rendering nation before coming to the United States.
Consider first the procedural factor. If the losing party has a
potentially valid claim that the procedure or award is illegal, the
one recourse generally available 17 to him under the laws of the
contracting states is a motion to set aside the award in the local
court of competent jurisdiction. 1 8 The grounds for setting aside
an award are similar to the grounds for refusing to enforce an
award under the Convention.' 9
The procedural advantage to the plaintiff who obtains a
judgment on his award stems from the fact that in some countries, a judicially confirmed award is almost immune from a motion to set aside.2 ° Moreover, in many countries the filing of a
motion to execute or the entering of an execution order begins
the running of the statute of limitations for the motion to set
aside. 2 1 Accordingly, in order to cut off his opponent's rights or
16 One of the primary goals of the drafting conference was to give the arbitral award
a force of its own, without the requirement of a judgment thereon in the rendering
country. See G. HAIGHT, supra note 7, at 39-44. Although the language of the Convention
may not convey this consensus, art. V, para. I(e), the negotiating history of the Convention is clear on the intent of the drafters. See G. HAIGHT, supra note 7, at 33-34.
17 A summary of the arbitration laws of 67 countries can be found in INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW THROUGHOUT THE

WORLD (1964) [hereinafter cited as ICC].
IS There are some exceptions. In Mexico, appeal is the only recourse open to the
losing party. Id., Mexico 6. In the Soviet Union, awards of the semi-official Arbitration
Commission are unassailable on rendition. Id., U.S.S.R. 6.
19 Compare C. PRO. Civ. art. 1028 (69e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1973) (Fr.); ZPO
§ 1041 (Baumbach-Lauterbach 1970) (W. Ger.); Indian Arbitration Act of 1940 § 30;
Arbitration Law of July 30, 1968, ch. 5, § 24, 22 LAws OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 210 (off.

trans. 1968); C. CiV. PRO. art. 801 (EHS L. Bull. Ser. 1972) (Japan); ICC, supra note 17,
Netherlands 6, with notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., the Israeli arbitration law, Arbitration Law ofJuly 30, 1968, ch. 5, § 27(c),
22 LAws OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 210 (off. trans. 1968), and the Japanese arbitration law,

C. CiV. PRO. arts. 799-804 (EHS L. Bull. Ser. 1972).
21 In France, the limitation period of one month begins to run only on execution.
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at least to begin the running of the limitation period, the successful party to a foreign arbitration is likely to seek judicial confirmation as a matter of course.2 2
Even absent these procedural considerations, the prevailing
party would likely be persuaded to seek enforcement in the
rendering country by three practical effects of the judgment.
First, as noted above,2 3 the courts of a contracting state may
refuse recognition and enforcement of an award if the award is
not yet "binding on the parties. 2 4 Although the negotiating history of the Convention makes it clear that the word "binding"
was not intended to make an award unenforceable absent a
judgment thereon, 25 a judgment, in addition to presenting the
enforcing court with a neater package, will resolve the question
26
of binding effect for even the most skeptical court.
Second, by forcing the losing party to interpose his motion
to set aside the award before foreign enforcement is sought, the
prevailing party can avoid both the inconvenience of litigating in
two countries at the same time and the delay in enforcement that
27
may result when a motion to suspend or set aside is pending.
Finally, if in selecting the law to govern the arbitration (a
choice vested in the parties under the Convention)2 8 the parties
have made the likely choice of the law of the rendering nation,2 9
a judgment for the prevailing party may limit, and possibly even
eliminate, the opportunities for the enforcing court to misapply
the foreign law. By moving for execution, the prevailing party
forces his adversary to make, and the court in the rendering
nation1 to decide, a motion to set aside; the grounds for a motion
Decree of Aug. 28, 1972, arts. 66, 78, [1972] J.O. 9300, [1972] D.S.L. 475. In Israel, the
period of 45 days runs from the date of rendition of the award. Arbitration Law of July
30, 1968, ch. 5, § 27(a), 22 LAws OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 210 (off. trans. 1968). In Japan,

execution carries the Israeli consequences. C. CiV. PRO. art. 802(2) (EHS L. Bull. Ser.
1972).
22 It should be noted that procedurally, there are no disincentives to seeking execution. In many countries, the filing of the award with the appropriate court is often
beyond the control of the parties. See, e.g., C. PRO. Civ. art. 1020 (69e ed. Petits Codes
Dalloz 1973) (Fr.); C. CIv. PRO. art. 799(2) (EHS L. Bull. Ser. 1972) (Japan); ICC, supra
note 17, Netherlands 4. Even where the parties must file the award, however, the burden
of formalization is largely borne by the arbitrators. See, e.g., Arbitration Law of July 30,
1968, ch. 5, § 27(d), 22 LAws OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 210 (off. trans. 1968).
23 Text accompanying note 9 supra.

Convention, art. V, para. l(e).
5See note 16 supra.
2'6
See In re Fotochrome, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 26, 29-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
27 Convention, art. VI.
2
S5ee, e.g., id., art. V, para. 1(a).
29This choice is likely because it is the law with which the arbitrators wirl be most
familiar and thus least likely to err.
24

2
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to set aside, however, may be similar or even identical to those
for nonenforcement under the Convention. 30 The Convention
requires the enforcing court to apply the law of the rendering
nation in deciding whether there are any grounds for nonenforcement. To the extent that these issues are litigated on the
motion to set aside the award, the plaintiff will have evidence of
how the rendering nation's law would be applied by that nation's
courts to the given facts. 3 1 Even if all of the foreign-law issues
that could be raised under the Convention were not litigated on
the motion to set aside, the prevailing party would still be closer
to enforcement by the number of such issues that were litigated.
Given the practical implications of a judgment and the procedural considerations discussed above, the prevailing party confident of the legal validity of his award 32 will have a strong inducement to seek foreign execution before coming to the United
States. It appears, therefore, that many, if not most, awards entering the United States for enforcement will be accompanied by
foreign judgments.
C.

The Relevance of State Law to the Treatment of ForeignJudgments
Based upon Arbitral Awards Under the Convention
In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,33 the Supreme Court extended the holding of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 34 to
the choice of law rules of the state in which a federal court sits.
In diversity cases, therefore, a federal court will apply its state's
rules of conflict of laws-an area of jurisprudence normally
viewed as including the treatment accorded foreign and sisterstate judgments. 35 Shortly after the Klaxon decision, a federal
oSee note 19 supra & accompanying text.
31Of course, if the losing party did not make the motion to set aside, this result
would not follow. By not making the motion to set aside before the prevailing party's
motion for execution is decided, however, the losing party would likely waive his right
ever to make it. See note 21 supra & accompanying text.
32 If the prevailing party is not confident of the validity of his award, it is arguable
that he would be wiser to avoid the courts of the country whose law applies to the award
and to hope instead for a misapplication of that law by the enforcing court. This tendency to avoid a judgment is mitigated by two factors: (1) if the prevailing party in the
arbitration is not forever barred, he may prefer to settle the matter at home without a
trip abroad; and (2) at some point along the continuum of validity, the losing party will,
in all probability, seek judicial action himself.
33313 U.S. 487 (1941).
3-304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 45 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
Traditionally, discussions of the treatment of foreign judgments in the federal courts
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district court went so far as to assume that Texas public policy
was relevant in a suit on a Mexican award of attorney's fees, and
proceeded to enforce the judgment as not inconsistent with that
36
policy.
These decisions could have set the stage for the wholesale
application of state law to the enforcement of foreign judgments.
It took twenty-five years, however, for a federal court to interpret Erie/Klaxon as requiring this result.3 7 The delay was due
more to the nature of the cases raising the issue of prior foreign
adjudication than to any lack of judicial perception. The great
majority of post-Klaxon foreign judgment cases required the
courts to resolve the recognition question in the context of federal question litigation;3 8 several of the non-federal question
cases were decided on grounds that did not require the courts to
have revolved around the controversial 1895 case of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113
(1895). In that case a French citizen, as plaintiff, recovered judgment against an American citizen in a French court, and subsequently sued in federal court to execute the
judgment. After an exhaustive review of the authorities, Mr. Justice Gray enunciated the
much-quoted test that:
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a
court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings,
after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system
of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between
the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing
to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it was
sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the
comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should
not, in an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as
on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the
judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.
Id. at 202-03. As the case turned out, however, the Court found such a "special reason" in
the fact that France would not give a judgment from the United States more than prima
facie effect. Reciprocity, therefore, became the rule for the federal courts. In light of Erie
and Klaxon, however, Hilton is no longer controlling. See Domingo v. States Marine Lines,
340 F. Supp. 811, 816 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
36 Compania Mexicana Rediodifusora Franteriza v. Spann, 41 F. Supp 907 (N.D.
Tex. 1941), aff'd, 131 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1942).
37Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966).
" The major areas implicated were: admiralty, Petition of Bloomfield S.S. Co., 298
F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 422 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1970); Bouas v. Sociedad
Maritima San Nicholas, S.A., 252 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), cert."denied, 382 U.S.
1025 (1966); Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la
Habana, 218 F. Supp. 938 (D. Md. 1963), affd, 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964); Perdikouris
v. The Liberian S/S Olympos, 185 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Va. 1960); Applewhaite v. The SS
Sunprincess, 150 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); bankruptcy, In re Wyse, 340 F.2d 719
(6th Cir. 1965); Waxman v. Kealoha, 296 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Hawaii 1969); Jones Act (46
U.S.C. § 688 (1970)), Zorgias v. The SS Hellenic Star, 370 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. La. 1972),
affd per curiam, 487 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1973); Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F.
Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1970), afffd mem., 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971); the federal securities laws, Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1971),
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reach the choice of law question.3 9 In 1966, however, a Massachusetts district court enforced a Swedish judgment after
giving it only the prima facie effect allowed by century-old Massachusetts cases.4 0 In 1971, the Third Circuit adopted the Penn42
sylvania rule 4 1 in an action on an English default judgment,
and a year later a New York district court noted that "[i]n a
diversity suit on a foreign judgment brought43 in or removed to
federal court, state law would plainly apply.
The implication of these decisions is clear: The treatment to
be accorded foreign judgments is a matter of state law.4 4 There
has been some speculation about the development of a federal
law of foreign judgment recognition,4 5 but until decisive action is
taken, state law will continue to govern the treatment of foreign
judgments in American courts.
The question naturally arises, Are foreign judgments based
upon arbitral awards under the Convention to be given the same
state law treatment? In enacting the legislation implementing the
Convention, Congress could have made the treatment of foreign
award-based judgments a federal question. 46 It did not do so.
Accordingly, it must be assumed that absent further congresmodified, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); Kane v. Central Am.
Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); and immigration, MacKay v.
McAlexander, 268 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 961 (1960); In re
Naturalization of Malaszenko, 204 F. Supp. 744 (D.N.J. 1962).
"' See Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 896 (1954);
Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Yoder v. Yoder, 24 Ohio App. 2d
71, 263 N.E.2d 913 (1970).
40 Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966). In this
context "prima facie effect" means that the defendant is entitled to reassert all relevant
defenses. Id. at 450.
41In re Estate of Christoff, 411 Pa. 419, 192 A.2d 737 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
965 (1964).
42 Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
43Domingo v. States Marine Lines, 340 F. Supp. 811, 816 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
44See cases cited notes 40-43 supra; British Midland Airways Ltd. v. International
Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1974); Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron
Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974); In re
Fotochrome, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (dictum); Toronto-Dominion Bank v.
Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Ark. 1973). But cf. American Express Co. v. Brown, 392 F.
Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
452 A. EHRENZWEIG & E. JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 189-2 (1973); 12
VILL. L. REV. 618 (1967); see Reese, The Status in This Country ofJudgments Rendered Abroad,
50 COLUMI. L. REV. 783, 786-88 (1950).
46It is doubtful that Erie would stand in the way if Congress enacted such legislation
to prevent the subversion of the regulatory scheme embodied in the Convention and
implementing legislation, which Congress clearly had the constitutional power to adopt.
See note 133 infra.
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sional action, the state law of foreign judgments will govern the
treatment of foreign judgments based upon arbitral awards
under the Convention. This Comment will therefore continue
with a discussion of the treatment of foreign judgments under
the laws of the several states to set the stage for an examination
of the policies that should control the merger decision.
D.

State Law on ForeignJudgments

1. Case Law
As a general matter,
Existing case authority ...

permits the ...

conclu-

sion that judgments of foreign countries will normally
be recognized and enforced by American courts. Such a
result is required by considerations of justice to the individual litigants or, stated in legal terms, because the
principle of res judicata applies to such judgments with
equal force as to those of local origin.
In the vast majority of states, 48 the courts characterize a foreign
judgment as conclusive on the merits, thus limiting review to
questions of personal
and subject matter jurisdiction, fraud, and
49
public policy.

Lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the
foreign proceedings is uniformly held to destroy the effect of a
foreign judgment. At a minimum, the courts apply fourteenth
amendment due process standards; 50 in many cases, however,
the courts apply to foreign judgments state due process concepts
which purport to exceed federal requirements. 51
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the foreign court has
47 Reese, supra note 45, at 800. Contra, Smit, InternationalRes Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44, 48 n.23 (1962).
48 In a few old but unreversed cases, however, foreign judgments were held to
warrant prima facie effect only, thus saving all defenses that could be raised against the
original claim. E.g., Kerr, Brown & Co. v. Condy, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 372 (1873); Tremblay
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 97 Me. 547, 55 A. 509 (1903), appeal dismissed, 223 U.S. 185 (1912);
see Eastern
Townships Bank v. H.S. Beebe & Co., 53 Vt. 177 (1880).
49
See, e.g., Northern Alumimum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 646, 147 A.715, 717
(1929); Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N.Y. 70, 75, 33 N.E. 729, 730 (1893); Reese, supra note
45, at 784.
50 E.g., Jackson v. Stelco Employees' Credit Union Ltd., 203 So.2d 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Wilson v. Gibson, 214 Mo. App. 219, 259 S.W. 491 (1924).
51 E.g., McEwan v. Zimmer, 38 Mich. 765 (1878); Davidson & Co. v. Allen, 508 P.2d
6 (Nev. 1973); Schacht v. Schacht, 435 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Smith v.
Grady, 68 Wis. 215, 31 N.W. 477 (1887).
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arisen as a defense to enforcement of a foreign judgment almost
exclusively in the divorce context. In most states, the domicile of
at least one of the spouses is still the sine qua non ofjurisdiction to
sever the marital relationship. 52 Here again, the courts tend to
apply their own laws on domicile without regard to the jurisdictional requirements of the foreign law, 53 although violation of
the latter can become an easy threshold ground for nonrecognition. 5 4 Outside of the divorce context, some judges hesitate
to pass on the competence of a foreign court. 55 If the issue is
clearly drawn, however,56 the courts will not shrink from adjudicating that question.
Another defense to enforcement of a foreign judgment is
extrinsic fraud. The defense encompasses behavior that caused
the foreign court to exercise a jurisdiction it otherwise would
that it had,57 but it can be extended to cover colluhave denied
58
suits.
sive
"Public policy" is a universally recognized exception to the
59
general rule mandating the enforcement of foreign judgments.
The boundaries of this exception, however, are difficult to fix.
Arguably included in public policy is the rule against enforcing
60
judgments that are penal in the private international sense,
and courts sometimes subsume valid objections to personal or
subject-matter jurisdiction under this rubric. 6 1 Also included are
violations of "fundamental fairness" or of due process in the

'2 See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 70-72 (1971). Contra, Scott v.
Scott, 51 Cal. 2d 249, 254, 331 P.2d 641, 644 (1958) (Traynor, J., concurring); Rosenstiel
v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 943 (1966).
53E.g., Schacht v. Schacht, 435 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); see Ryder v.
Ryder, 2 Cal. App. 2d 426, 37 P.2d 1069 (1934); Sargent v. Sargent, 225 Pa. Super. 1,
307 A.2d 353 (1973); In re Estate of Steffke, 222 N.W.2d 628 (Wis. 1974).
4 See Yoder v. Yoder, 24 Ohio App. 2d 71, 263 N.E.2d 913 (1970).
5
1 E.g., In re Estate of Gillies, 8 N.J. 88, 83 A.2d 889 (1951) (Greek adoption decree).
56 E.g., San Lorenzo Title & Improvement Co. v. City Mortgage Co., 124 Tex. 25, 73
S.W.2d 513 (1934) (before a Mexican adjudication of title, the land in question had been
assigned to Texas under a treaty).
17 E.g., Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 21 So. 2d 141, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 718 (1945)
(service upon wife by publication after husband misrepresented his ability to locate her).
-1 Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. California Dev. Co., 171 Cal. 173, 152 P. 542 (1915).
-1 Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J.
1027, 1056 (1940).
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 120, commentd (1971); see Loucks
v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (sister-state).
61 E.g., In re Estate of Nolan, 56 Ariz. 361, 108 P.2d 388 (1940); Christopher v.
Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818 (1944); Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J.
Super. 114, 190 A.2d 684 (App. Div. 1963), aff'd, 42 N.J. 287, 200 A.2d 123 (1964).
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foreign proceedings.6 2 The public policy exceptions uniformly
comprehend the illegality of the underlying cause of action, but
that the cause no longer exists in the enforcing state is not neces63
sarily conclusive.
2. State Statutory Law
State statutes explicitly dealing with the effect of foreign
judgments have taken predictable forms. In 1907 California
enacted a liberal provision, giving a "final" judgment from a
foreign country the same effect it would have in that country,
and the same effect as a California judgment, so long as the
foreign court had jurisdiction "according to the laws of such
country. '6 4 In Montana, Oregon, and Puerto Rico, in rem decrees with jurisdiction are given conclusive effect on title, while
in personam judgments are presumptive evidence of a right
which can be rebutted only for "a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact."' 65 In New Hampshire, the legislature has extended to
Canadian judgments only "such faith and credit as is given in the
courts of the Dominion of Canada . . . to the judgments rendered in the courts of New Hampshire, '66 but has left to com67
mon law the treatment of judgments from other countries.
The major trend developing in this area of the law is the
growing acceptance of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act. 68 To date, the Act has been adopted, essentially
intact, by eight states. 6 9 As adopted by the Commissioners on
62 In re Estate of O'Dea, 29 Cal. App. 3d 759, 105 Cal. Rptr. 756, 765-66 (Ct. App.
1973); In re Davis' Will, 31 Misc. 2d 270, 219 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sur. Ct. 1961) (judgment
rendered after death of party without representation of his estate); Malika Estate, 31 Pa.
D. & C.2d 736 (Orphans' Ct. 1963) (judgment based largely on hearsay); Banco Minero
v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711 (1915) (denial of right to present a defense and
denial of appeal on frivolous grounds).
63 Neporany v. Kir, 5 App. Div. 2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1958) (seduction and
criminal conversation).
64 Act of Mar. 11, 1907, ch. 178, § 1, [1906) Cal. Stat. 206 (repealed 1974). The same
statute is in force in the Canal Zone and Guam. C.Z. CODE tit. 5, § 3198 (1963); GUAM
CODE CIv. PROC. § 1915 (1970).
65 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-1001-27 (1964); ORE. REv. STAT. § 43.190 (1973);

P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 32, § 1800 (1968).
66 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524:11 (Supp. 1973).

67See Stavrelis v. Zacharias, 79 N.H. 146, 106 A. 306 (1919); MacDonald v. Grand
Trunk Ry., 71 N.H. 448, 52 A. 982 (1902); Robinson v. Prescott, 4 N.H. 450 (1828).
68 9B UNIFORM LAWs ANN. 64 (West 1966).

69 ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.30.100-.180 (1973); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 1713-1713.8
(West 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 77, §§ 121-29 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MD. ANN. CODE,

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 124:223

Uniform State Laws, the act applies to foreign money judgments
which are "final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered" despite pending or available appeals. 70 The judgments
are enforced in the same way as sister-state decrees, 7 1 unless the
foreign court acted in violation of due process, or without personal or subject-matter jurisdiction, in which case the judgment
is not conclusive.72 The judgment "need not be recognized" if it
was rendered without adequate notice, was obtained by fraud,
was based on a cause of action repugnant to the state's public
policy, conflicted with another conclusive decree, was rendered
despite an agreement between the parties providing another
means of settlement, or was rendered despite forum non
conveniens. 73
III.

THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER

IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

A. In General
The doctrine of merger and the corresponding doctrine of
74
bar constitute the fundamental precepts of resjudicata, a principle designed "to secure the peace and repose of society by the
settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. ' 75 The
principle of merger is well established: "When a valid and final
personal judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff ...

[he]

cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original claim or any
part thereof, but he can maintain an action upon the judgment
.... 76 The doctrine is part of the common law of every American jurisdiction except Louisiana, where res judicata is purely
77
statutory.
When a foreign judgment is involved, however, the symmetry of the common law breaks down. In 1809, an English
COURTS & JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS §§

10-701 to -709 (1974), reenacting MD.

ANN. CODE

art.

35, §§ 53A-I (1971); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 235, § 23A (1974); MICH. CosiP. LAWS ANN.

§§ 691.1151-.1159 (1968); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 5301-09 (McKinney Supp. 1974);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 710-18 (Supp. 1974).
70 UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 2.
71Id. § 3.
72
1Id. § 4(a).
7
3 Id. § 4(b).
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGPMENTS §§ 47, 48 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).

Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 47 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
77 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2286 (West 1973). The Louisiana courts seem to think this
75

76

makes a difference. See, e.g., Durmeyer v. Streiffer, 215 La. 586, 41 So. 2d 226 (1949).
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court reasoned that because a foreign judgment is only prima
facie evidence of a debt, the underlying claim could not be
merged into it.78 The plaintiff, therefore, could elect to sue on
his original cause of action without regard to the domestically
applicable doctrine of merger. This exception to the general rule
eventually attained currency in both Canada7 9 and the United
States. 0
When foreign judgments began to be given more than
prima facie effect, the non-merger rule naturally came under
attack: 8 1 Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex.8 2 Several states have
83
clearly rejected the non-merger rule for essentially this reason,
and an English judge has strongly questioned the continuing
logic or vitality of the rule in his country.8 4 Although some
courts continue to utilize a non-merger point of view, 85 merger
may well be on its way to becoming the favored position.
B.

The Merger Doctrine in the Context of ForeignJudgments Based
upon Arbitral Awards Under the Convention
In determining whether to apply the merger doctrine to
foreign judgments based upon arbitral awards, courts can proceed in three directions. First, the courts could apply the merger
rule in all cases in order to vindicate the underlying policy of the
rule. Second, the courts could use traditional conflict of laws
analysis; the rules governing the preclusive effect of a foreign
judgment would be the rules governing judgments in the
rendering forum. Under this approach, if the judgment were
78 Hall v. Odber, 103 Eng. Rep. 949 (K.B. 1809).
79

E.g., Clergue v. Humphrey, 31 Can. S. Ct. 66 (1900).

80 Swift v. David, 181 F. 828 (9th Cir. 1910); New York, L.E. & W.R.R. v. McHenry,

17 F. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); Tourigny v. Houle, 88 Me. 406, 34 A. 158 (1896); Wood v.
Gamble, 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 8 (1853) (dictum); MacDonald v. Grand Trunk Ry., 71 N.H.
448, 52 A. 982 (1902); Eastern Townships Bank v. H.S. Beebe & Co., 53 Vt. 177 (1880).
81
E.g., G. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 538 (7th ed. 1965); A.
EHRENSWEIG & E. JAYME, supra note 45, at § 195-3; H. READ, RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 117-21 (1938).
82 The reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases.
83Alaska Commercial Co. v. Debney, 2 Alas. 303 (1904), rev'd on other grounds, 144 F.
1 (9th Cir. 1906); Baker v. Palmer, 83 Ill. 568 (1876); Jones v. Jamison, 15 La. Ann. 35
(1860); Swedish Am. Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson Co., 6 N.D. 222, 69 N.W. 455 (1896); Smith
v. Grady, 68 Wis. 215, 31 N.W. 477 (1887).
84 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1967] A.C. 853, 966 (1966)
(Lord Wilberforce).
85 See Sargant v. Monroe, 268 App. Div. 123, 49 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1944); Oilcakes &
Oilseeds Trading Co. v. Sinason-Teicher Inter Am. Grain Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 651, 170
N.Y.S.2d 378 (Sup. Ct. 1958), modified, 7 App. Div. 2d 977, 183 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1959),
affd mem., 8 N.Y.2d 852, 168 N.E.2d 708, 203 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1960).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 124:223

rendered in a civil law country, the underlying cause of action
would not be merged into the judgment because common law
merger is alien to the civil law system.8 6 If the judgment were
rendered in a common law country, the doctrine of merger
would be applicable. Third, the courts could apply the nonmerger rule to foreign judgments based upon arbitral awards
under the Convention. The remainder of this Comment will
argue that this last approach, as a matter of policy, is the correct
one.
IV.

THE JUSTIFICATION FOR APPLYING THE NON-MERGER RULE
TO FOREIGN JUDGMENTS BASED UPON ARBITRAL
AWARDS UNDER THE CONVENTION

A. The Law Controlling the Merger Question
Before proceeding with a discussion of the policy reasons
for refusing to merge arbitral awards into foreign judgments
based thereon, it is appropriate to determine whether resolution
of this merger question is a matter of state or federal law. In
fact, the merger decision is a federal question.
On the surface, this conclusion may seem anomalous because the merger question is incident to the effect of a foreign
judgment in the United States, which is in turn a matter of state
law. 8 7 If the plaintiff in a diversity case sues in federal court on

the judgment alone,8 8 the application of federal law to any aspect of the case would seem to be a clear violation of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins 9 and Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. 90 The
merger decision, however, is an essential step in resolving the
underlying jurisdictional issues in cases involving foreign judgments based upon arbitral awards under the Convention. As
such, merger must be a federal question. To take the clearest
example, if the plaintiff sues on the award under the federal
district court's original jurisdiction of actions under the
Convention, 9 and alternatively raises the judgment on pendent
jurisdiction because the award is for less than ten thousand dollars, then two federal questions are squarely raised. Do the two
PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 23, at 245 (1943).
87 See notes 33-46 supra & accompanying text.
88 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
89 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
86 A. NUSSBAUM,

90 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
919 U.S.C. § 203 (1970).
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claims partake of "a common nucleus of operative facts" 92 so as
to make pendent jurisdiction available? Does the federal claim
"have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction
on the court? ' 93 If either of these questions is answered in the
negative, then the federal court is without jurisdiction to hear
the state claim. Merger necessarily enters into the resolution of
the second issue because if the federal claim is merged into the
pendent claim, then the federal claim is not only insubstantial,
but nonexistent. Since the merger issue must be settled to determine the jurisdiction of the district court, the court has the
94
power-and the duty-to decide the issue by federal standards.
To illustrate further, suppose the plaintiff sues on both
claims but gives each an independent jurisdictional basis because
the award exceeds ten thousand dollars. In this situation the
court would retain jurisdiction irrespective of the outcome of the
merger decision, but the nature of its jurisdiction would change,
and with it the applicable law. Such a potent issue should certainly be resolved by uniform federal standards. 9 5 Furthermore,
the court would be deciding whether a treaty applies; if treaties
96
raise federal questions, so must issues of their applicability.
Because the merger decision is a federal question, the federal courts have the option of choosing an approach to the
merger question not heretofore discussed-application of the
forum state's rule governing the merger of foreign judgments.
This approach, however, like the two other approaches that reject non-merger-application of the merger rule in all cases and
use of conflict of laws analysis-suffers from serious weaknesses.
B.

Weaknesses of the Three Approaches That Reject Non-Merger

As a first approach to the merger question, the district court
could look to the law of the forum state on the merger of foreign
judgments. Although it is under no constitutional compulsion to
do so, the court may decide that, as a matter of comity in its
relationship to the state courts, it should apply the state rule
when no overarching federal standard exists. In the early stages
of litigation under the Convention this is an understandable re92 United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
93 Id.
94 See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 16 (2d ed. 1970); cf.
Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1120 (6th Cir. 1973).
95 Cf. Williams v. Ocean Transp. Lines, Inc., 425 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1970).
'6 See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964).
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sponse; after all, the implementing legislation appears to give the
state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction, 97 and a uniform
rule within the forum state is therefore necessary. As a rule to be
followed throughout the federal system, however, this approach
is inconsistent with the United States' treaty commitments.
In acceding to the Convention, the United States did not
represent to the other contracting states that state law was at all
relevant to their awards. The Convention, apparently on the
urging of Australia, 9 8 includes a "federal or non-unitary state"
clause that allows a country such as the United States to accede
without violating internal constitutional restraints on the exercise
of its national power. 99 If the United States had availed itself of
this article, the federal government would have been bound only
to the extent of its "legislative jurisdiction" and would have been
required to "bring such articles with a favourable recommendation to the notice of the appropriate authorities of constituent
states . ."."100
The United States thus could have involved state
law in the manner provided for in the Convention, but did not.
The possible negative impact of this approach on the legitimate
expectations of foreign participants in arbitration proceedings
could seriously undermine the chances of achieving the goals
that motivated the United States' accession to the Convention.
Accordingly, this approach should be rejected.
As a second approach to the merger question, the courts
could decide to apply the common law merger doctrine whenever that doctrine would be applicable. This response ensures
the uniformity lacking in the state law approach, but in so doing,
violates the Convention by imposing on the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards conditions "substantially more onerous"
than those imposed on domestic awards. 10 1 These conditions result from the full faith and credit doctrine. A domestic award
reduced to judgment is readily enforceable qua judgment. A
foreign award-based judgment, however, being unprotected by
the full faith and credit clause, 10 2 may not be enforceable in a
given state; if this is the case, the court would probably turn to
an examination of the award itself.10 3 As a result of this process,
97 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1970).

98G. HAIGHT, supra note 7, at 80-83.
99Convention, art. XI.

100
Id.

101 Convention, art. III.
102 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, comment b (1971).

103 See text accompanying notes 107-09 infra.
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the recognition and enforcement of the plaintiff's award would
be unnecessarily protracted. To prevent this imposition of the
"more onerous conditions" that the United States is committed
to avoid, the pure merger approach should be rejected.
As a third approach to the merger question, the courts
could follow the conflict of laws analysis and determine the
merger issue by the law of the nation whose judgment is
involved. 10 4 If a common law judgment is involved, however, this
approach does not address the problems raised in the remainder
of this Comment, and could in fact obscure their proper resolution by its compelling simplicity.' 0 5 Moreover, if as a matter of
policy it is undesirable to allow state law to determine the nature
of a federal court's jurisdiction,10 6 it is at least equally undesirable to allow foreign law to accomplish the same result.
C. Advantages of Non-Merger
The advantages of the non-merger approach are best classified in terms of the particular situation facing a court. The
reason for this is that although non-merger is generally to be
preferred, it is not always to be preferred for the same reason.
The discussion that follows, therefore, is .divided into four
categories representing the four possible situations with which a
court might be faced: (1) an enforceable award accompanied by
an unenforceable judgment; (2) an unenforceable award accompanied by an enforceable judgment; (3) an enforceable award
accompanied by an enforceable judgment; and (4) an unenforceable award accompanied by an unenforceable judgment.
1. Enforceable Award Accompanied by
Unenforceable Judgment
When the court is faced with an enforceable award accompanied by an unenforceable judgment, a decision to apply the
07
merger doctrine under any of the three merger approaches
should cause the court to refuse to merge the award into the
judgment. 0 8 For this reason, the non-merger approach is clearly
104 See text accompanying note 86 supra.
105At least one court has been impelled in this direction. Island Territory of
Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1318 n.4 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 986 (1974).
106See text accompanying notes 87-96 supra.
107 The term "merger approach" is used to describe any of the three approaches
rejecting non-merger described in text accompanying notes 97-106 supra.
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 47 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). It is as-
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preferable. Even if the court following a merger approach correctly applies the merger doctrine, non-merger, because it permits the court to enforce the award irrespective of the judgment,
saves the court the time that it takes to determine that the judgment is unenforceable. Moreover, if the court in following a
merger approach analyzes the merger issue incorrectly'0 9 and
merges the award into the unenforceable judgment, then the
court strips the plaintiff of his rights for no valid reason. Nonmerger prevents this unconscionable result.
2. Unenforceable Award Accompanied by
Enforceable Judgment
A court faced with an unenforceable award accompanied by
an enforceable judgment is confronted with the difficult issue of
the proper accommodation of federal and state interests in the
context of the existing division of competence between federal
and state courts. The definition of an enforceable foreign award
is a matter for federal law alone;"10 the definition of an enforceable foreign judgment is a matter for state law alone."' The
question in the instant case is whether a plaintiff can be permitted to recover under state law when the policy of the federal law
would require recovery to be denied.
a. The Likelihood That a Foreign Judgment Will Be Enforceable
Under State Law When the UnderlyingArbitralAward is Unenforceable
Under FederalLaw
An action on a foreign judgment is governed by state law. 1 2
Most states give foreign judgments conclusive effect, recognizing
as defenses only (1) that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction, (2)
that the proceedings were tainted by extrinsic fraud, and (3) that
the underlying cause of action is repugnant to the public policy
sumed that in limiting the application of the merger doctrine to "valid and final" judgments, id., the term "valid" is intended to mean "enforceable."
109 A court could easily analyze the issue incorrectly by failing to appreciate the
breadth of the term "valid judgment" as used in the merger doctrine, text accompanying
note 76 supra; the court could interpret the term to be used in the sense that sister-state
judgments are "valid" under the full faith and credit clause when not violative of due
process. See Alaska Commercial Co. v. Debney, 2 Alas. 303 (1904), rev'd on other grounds,
144 F. I (9th Cir. 1906).
110 See note 13 supra & accompanying text.
" See notes 33-46 supra & accompanying text.
112 Id.
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of the state."13 The treatment of arbitral awards under the Convention, on the other hand, is a matter of federal law, which
recognizes a limited number of defenses to enforcement including the defense that enforcement of the award would be contrary to federal public policy. 114 If it can be shown, therefore,
that the public policies that impeach a judgment under state law
bear no relationship to those that impeach an arbitral award
under federal law, the likelihood that a foreign judgment will be
enforceable under state law when the underlying arbitral award
is unenforceable under federal law will be established. The
requisite lack of relationship is easily shown.
In the federal-state context, variations in legislative competence will in themselves lead to differing definitions of what a
government and its courts simply will not do as a matter of
public policy. Some matters the states leave to Caesar because
they must, others because they have no interest in them. Even
where federal and state interests coincide, it is within the power
of each state to determine the degree of importance it will attach
to its interests, without reference to the importance the federal
government places on its corresponding concerns. As a theoretical matter, therefore, uniformity of response will at best
be fortuitous.
In applying the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925,115 the
courts have isolated a number of federal legislative interests
which they consider inappropriate for settlement by arbitra8
tion:" 6 issues under the securities laws, 1 7 antitrust claims,"
113 See text accompanying notes 47-73 supra.

114See notes 9-11 supra & accompanying text.
115 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
116 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1970) allows the incorporation of such precedent into the law
governing foreign awards. Because such exceptions are mandated in article V of the
Convention, they are "not in conflict with... the Convention as ratified by the United
States." Id. But see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
H7 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa
(1970)); Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Cal. 1974)
(Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to hh-1 (1970)); Reader v. Hirsch &
Co., 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (1934 Act).
n' Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Helfenbein v. International Indus.,
Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); Associated Milk Dealers,
Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 422 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1970); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v.
Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P.
Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). Without this exception, Judge Feikens'
tortuous decision in Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499 (E.D.
Mich. 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-1651, 6th Cir., June 19, 1974, would have been
unnecessary.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 124:223

and patent validity.1 19 These prohibitions generally do not apply
to submissions to arbitration after the claim has arisen, but serve
to render such claims nonarbitrable pursuant to a broad, preexisting arbitration clause. 120 As national priorities change, it can
be expected that Congress or the courts will find that other
federal interests are so compelling that they require a protection
which the private vindication of contractual rights through arbitration will provide imperfectly at best, and will frustrate at
121
worst.
To be sure, some states have echoed federal law in exempting claims under local blue sky or antitrust statutes from
arbitration. 122 The importance of this congruity is negligible,
however, because (1) the states are under no compulsion to follow federal law in the interpretation of their own statutes; (2) no
necessary correlation exists between these exceptions and the
public policy objections to the enforcement of a foreign judgment; and (3) even assuming such a correlation, it is highly improbable that the state whose law is used to validate the judgment would have had jurisdiction over the transaction alleged to
violate local law. It is so easy to serve a corporate defendant in a
state that had no contact with the transaction in question that to
depend on state law to reach the federal result would be irrational.
The courts, therefore, are likely to be faced with foreign
judgments that are enforceable under state law but that are
based upon arbitral awards unenforceable as a matter of federal
law. Several policy considerations point toward a resolution of
the problem.
119 Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971); Leesona Corp. v. Cotwool Mfg. Corp., 204 F. Supp. 141
(W.D.S.C. 1962), aff'd, 315 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1963).
120 See, e.g., Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 949 (1972) (securities & antitrust issues); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968) (Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970), &
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to hh-1 (1970)).
121 Two such areas that come to mind immediately are energy allocation and the
protection of the environment.
122E.g., Shearson, Hammill & Co. v. Vouis, 247 So. 2d 733 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 253 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1971) (securities); Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods.,
Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968) (antitrust); see Foreman v.
Holsman, 10 Ill. 2d 551, 141 N.E.2d 31 (1957) (invalid release from blue sky liability). But
cf. Mills v. Robert W. Gottfried, Inc., 272 So. 2d 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
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b.

The Policy Considerations
In Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, 123 the Second
Circuit was faced with a judgment that was enforceable under
state law, but that was based on an arbitral award arguably unenforceable as a matter of federal law. Plaintiff was the successful
party in a Curacaoan arbitration. Before coming to the United
States for enforcement of the arbitral award, plaintiff sought
enforcement in the Curacaoan courts and obtained a judgment
on his award. When he brought suit in federal district court,
plaintiff thus sought enforcement of either the award or the
Curacaoan judgment.
Under the view of the case taken by the court, it was necessary to decide whether an award-based judgment could be enforced under state law if the underlying award were unenforceable as a matter of federal law. The court pointed out that "the
policy of New York State to recognize foreign judgments 'prevails in the absence of interference with the federal regulatory
scheme'-"124 and, finding no such interference, held that an
award-based judgment could be enforced notwithstanding the
invalidity of the award.
The court's failure to find interference with the federal regulatory scheme was based upon its observation that "the Convention on Recognition itself and its enforcing legislation go only to
the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award and not to the enforcement of foreign judgments confirming foreign arbitral
awards ... .,"125 By looking only to words rather than effects, the
court overlooked a blatant source of interference.
In implementing the Convention, Congress certainly did not
intend to arrogate to the federal government powers that it did
not otherwise possess. 126 By explicitly creating federal question
jurisdiction over foreign arbitral awards, 2 7 however, Congress
clearly intended that the arbitrability and public policy exceptions to enforcement would be defined by federal substantive
123 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973).
24
' Id. at 1319 (quoting Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414
U.S. 117, 140 (1973)).
25

1 Id.
126 SENATE CONMI.

ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWVARDS, S. REP. No.

91-702, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970).
127 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1970).
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law. If the courts were permitted to enforce award-based judgments notwithstanding the unenforceability of the underlying
award, then the holder of an unenforceable award would be
encouraged to evade the federal standards by executing his
award abroad. In this respect, the treatment of foreign arbitral
awards would for all purposes except nomenclature become a
matter of state, not federal, law. As a matter of policy, therefore,
it follows, notwithstanding Solitron, that the courts should not
willingly become partners in the subversion of a federal regulatory scheme by enforcing foreign judgments based upon invalid
arbitral awards.
c. A Means of Preventing Subversion of the Federal Regulatory
Scheme
The supremacy clause of the Constitution provides a means
for the courts to prevent the subversion of the federal regulatory
scheme. In all jurisdictions, the illegality of the underlying cause
of action is a recognized ground for nonenforcement of a
foreign judgment; 1 28 the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act acknowledges that a foreign judgment need not
be enforced when "the [cause of action] . . .on which the judg'1 29
ment is based is repugnant to the public policy of [the] state.'
The supremacy clause injects federal policy into state public policy so that an award is repugnant to state public policy if repugnant to federal policy.
In Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,°30 the state of Connecticut refused to enforce rights arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, contending that enforcement of the congressionally created right was contrary to Connecticut policy.
The Supreme Court refuted the basis of this contention:
When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided
to it by the Constitution, adopted that Act, it spoke for
all the people and all the States, and thereby established
a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of
Connecticut as if the act had emanated from its own
legislature, and should be respected accordingly in the
courts of the State.' 3 '
12' See note 63 supra & accompanying text.
129

UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT

130 223 U.S. 1 (1911).
131Id. at 57.

§ 4(b)(3).
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Similarly, when Rhode Island refused to enforce a particular
federal law on the ground that the law violated the state's policy
against enforcing "penal" statutes not its own, the Court responded simply that "the policy
of the federal Act is the prevail32
ing policy in every state.'
Because an arbitral award can be invalid only if it violates
the federal policy expressed in the treaty and implementing
legislation, an award invalid under federal law is, by virtue of the
supremacy clause, repugnant to the policy of all states. By incorporating the federal grounds for denying enforcement of
awards into the state public policy grounds for denying enforcement of an award-based judgment, the supremacy clause
133
prevents subversion of the federal regulatory scheme.
d. The Role of Non-Merger
In order to illustrate the role of non-merger in the supremacy clause approach proposed above, it is instructive to
consider the procedural setting in which the pertinent defense
will be raised given the applicability of the merger doctrine.
The plaintiff will enter an American court, assumed here to be a

132Testa

v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947).
alternative approach to the problem of award-based judgments begins with
the recognition that if the judicial treatment prescribed by the treaty for arbitral awards
was also applicable to foreign judgments on such awards as well, the divergence between
state and federal law would not result in the subveirsion of the federal scheme since,
under the supremacy clause, the treaty would take precedence over inconsistent state law.
See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 198, 236-37 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.). One
commentator, desiring to protect the integrity of the federal scheme, has attempted to
invoke this principle by arguing that the Convention is applicable to foreign judgments
on arbitral awards because its draftsmen intended it to apply to such judgments. 5 GA. J.
INT'L L. & CoMP. L. 264 (1975). This argument is seriously impaired, however, by the
natural inference, from the treaty's failure to discuss the treatment to be given judgments
on arbitral awards, that the draftsmen, far from intending the treaty to resolve the
problem, never even considered it. Accordingly, this method of vindicating the federal
interest must be rejected.
It should be pointed out that the problems posed by judgments on arbitral awards
can be resolved independent of the courts, either through a new traty governing the
treatment of foreign judgments on arbitral awards, or through legislation to the same
effect under the existing Convention. Such action would preempt the field so as to
invalidate the state law of foreign judgments as applied to judgments on arbitral awards
under the treaty.
A treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land, that is, of all the United
States, if any act of a state legislature can stand in its way .... The people of
America have been pleased to declare that... laws of any of the states, contrary
to a treaty, shall be disregarded.
Ware v. Hylton, supra at 236-37 (opinion of Chase, J.).
133 An
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state court, 134 seeking enforcement of an award-based foreign
judgment in his favor. In his defense, the defendant will raise
the state's public policy exception to enforcement of foreign
judgments arguing (1) that the underlying award is invalid
under federal law; (2) that the award is accordingly repugnant to
the policy expressed in the treaty and implementing legislation;
(3) that by virtue of the supremacy clause the award is repugnant
to the public policy of the state; and therefore, (4) that the state's
public policy exception to enforcement is applicable. It is then
open to the plaintiff to argue (1) that the doctrine of merger
operates to bar the unsuccessful defendant from raising new
defenses to the suit on the award in later actions between the
parties; (2) that defendant's argument that the award is invalid is
a defense to the suit on the award; and therefore, (3) that the
defendant is estopped by the doctrine of merger from raising
the invalidity of the award.
Whether a state court would accept plaintiff's argument is
unclear. Presumably, the doctrine of merger should operate to
preclude the defendant from raising only those defenses that
were, or "might have been," raised in the prior litigation. 13 5 Because the United States' defenses to the enforcement of the
award probably were not available in the foreign tribunal, it is at
least arguable that the United States' defenses were not among
those that "might have been" raised in the action on the award,
and thus, thlat merger does not preclude the defendant from
raising these defenses in the action on the judgment. It must be
emphasized, however, that once the federal courts decide that
the doctrine of merger applies to arbitral awards and judgments
based thereon, the substance of the merger doctrine is a matter
of state law. Accordingly, a state could declare that its merger
doctrine prevents the defendant from raising in the action on
the judgment even those defenses that he could not have raised
in the action on the award. It is also possible that a court could
fail to appreciate the subtleties of merger and simply accept the
plaintiff's description of the merger doctrine. In either of these
situations the result of a merger approach would be the subver36
sion of the federal regulatory scheme.'
I" Because of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the analysis should be no
different if the plaintiff sues in federal court in a diversity case.
135See, e.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876).
136 Of course the subversion would not necessarily continue ad infinitum. If a state
supreme court were to apply the merger doctrine to defenses that could not have been

1975]

FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ON FOREIGN AWARDS

Under the non-merger rule, the federal regulatory scheme
would be protected even in these situations. It is the essence of
non-merger that neither the arbitral award nor the defenses to
its enforcement are extinguished. It follows, therefore, that the
defendant could not be estopped from proving the invalidity of
the award under federal law, and thus would be able to invoke
the public policy ground for nonenforcement of a foreign judgment. Accordingly, the policy considerations discussed above dictate that non-merger be preferred to the merger approaches
when the court is faced with an unenforceable award accompanied by an enforceable judgment.
3. Unenforceable Award Accompanied by
an Unenforceable Judgment
In the case of an unenforceable award accompanied by an
unenforceable judgment, the non-merger approach is to be preferred as a matter of effective judicial administration. If the
plaintiff sues on his judgment alone, then non-merger and
merger take the same amount of judicial time. If, however, the
plaintiff sues on his award, or both judgment and award, nonmerger can result in a significant saving of time. If the doctrine
of merger is applicable, the court will look first to the validity of
the judgment. If the defendant has more than one defense, the
court is likely to decide one or more of the non-public policy
defenses before reaching the public policy defense, under which
1 37
it will find the award to be invalid as a matter of federal law
and, therefore, will hold the judgment unenforceable. Under
non-merger, however, the court will look first to the award, and,
finding it invalid, will find the judgment invalid. 13 8 The difference between merger and non-merger in this situation, then, is
that non-merger saves judicial time by avoiding the need to decide unnecessary defenses.
raised in the action on the award and the United States Supreme Court were to review
that decision, the Court could prevent the undesired result. It is doubtful that the Court
would rewrite the state's merger rule as a matter of federal law; more likely the Court
would hold that, if this is what the state means by "merger," it cannot apply the doctrine
to foreign arbitral awards where paramount federal interests are involved. See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946) (Pennsylvania's expansive
definition of "real property" for tax purposes does not so burden federal ownership of
industrial plants as to require a federal definition of that term as used in the federal
statute). A failure of the lower federal courts to adopt the non-merger approach could be
remedied by the Supreme Court's requiring them to do so.
137See text accompanying notes 110-36 supra.
138 Id.
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4. Enforceable Award Accompanied by
Enforceable Judgment
In the case of an enforceable award accompanied by an
enforceable judgment, the non-merger approach is to be preferred as a matter of sound jurisprudence. Non-merger, by forcing the courts to decide the merits of federal defenses, encourages the growth of the common law of arbitral awards and the
development of definite standards for measuring future claims.
Under the merger approaches, however, the defendant may
be estopped from raising his defenses to the award. 1 39 When
both award and judgment are enforceable, a court does not subvert the federal scheme by enforcing the judgment and ignoring
the award. By doing so, however, the court avoids analyzing the
merits of the federal defenses and inhibits the development of
the common law of arbitral awards which should supplement the
treaty and the implementing legislation. The longer the courts
refrain from scrutinizing inadequate defenses by enforcing
judgments, the longer it will take to evolve the proper standards
for measuring similar claims. Even poor defenses are rejected
for a reason, and the reason is the guide to future adjudication
without which both the parties and the courts are set adrift.
V.

CONCLUSION

The federal courts will soon be required to determine
whether traditional concepts of res judicata are applicable to
foreign judgments entered on arbitral awards under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards. Although the issue may, on its face, appear to be procedural underbrush, the courts should not allow this first impression to cause them to overlook the policy implications of the
choice. This Comment has attempted to identify the alternatives
open to the courts and to outline the policies that should guide
140
their determination.
139See text accompanying notes 134-36 supra.

140RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 47, comment i (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973)
states:

Merger in a judgment on a judgment. When the plaintiff has obtained a judgment against the defendant and brings an action upon the judgment, and obtains a judgment in that action, the first judgment is not merged in the second
judgment .... The plaintiff can enforce either judgment.. . but satisfaction of
one of the judgments operates also as satisfaction of the other.

This rule provides a doctrinal method for arriving at the result advocated by this Comment. Because the purpose of the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
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The interest in finality that res judicata protects should not
control the treatment of arbitral awards under the Convention.
Outweighing that interest are the policies of sound jurisprudence, effective judicial administration, federalism, and simple
equity.
Foreign Arbitral Awards is to make arbitral awards as enforceable as judgments, see note
16 supra & accompanying text, it should not be difficult for a court to deem the award to
be a judgment for the purposes of this rule. In this manner, the actual foreign judgment
becomes a judgment on a judgment, and, in accordance with well established doctrine,
the court can achieve the non-merger result.

